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The Mauritius Convention on Transparency  
and the Multilateral Tax Instrument:  
models for the modification of treaties?
Nathalie Bravo*
The investment treaty network and the tax treaty network comprise more than 3,000 
treaties each. The provisions of these treaties generally are highly customized on the 
basis of the investment flows and economic interests of the contracting States. The 
number of treaties in force and their customization potentially turn the amendment 
of these treaty networks in their entirety into a cumbersome and long process. To 
modify the treaty networks in a swift and coordinated manner, the investment treaty 
makers and the tax treaty makers almost contemporaneously developed the idea 
of implementing treaty changes through a single multilateral convention. On 10 
December 2014, the United Nations adopted the Convention on Transparency in 
Treaty-based Investor–State Arbitration, also known as the Mauritius Convention. 
In addition, on 24 November 2016, the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax 
Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), 
commonly referred to as the Multilateral Tax Instrument, was concluded under the 
aegis of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
The Mauritius Convention and the Multilateral Tax Instrument share the object 
and purpose of modifying an extensive number of treaties. However, due to their 
novelty, little research has been done until now on their common characteristics 
and differences. The article aims at filling this gap by comparing both multilateral 
conventions. It also aims at drawing lessons from the analysis of both multilateral 
conventions that might be of benefit for future modifications of an extensive number 
of treaties through a single instrument. 
Keywords: Multilateral Tax Instrument, BEPS, bilateral tax treaties, bilateral 
investment treaties, Mauritius Convention
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1. Introduction 
International investment agreements (IIAs) are concluded between States 
to promote and protect the investments made by investors from one of the 
contracting States in the territory of another contracting State.1 IIAs grant rights to 
investors against arbitrary conduct by host States2 and, most importantly, typically 
allow for investment disputes to be resolved by international arbitration rather than 
by potentially biased domestic courts.3 In contrast, tax treaties are concluded 
between States to allocate taxing rights over the income of taxpayers active in their 
jurisdictions to only one of them and thus avoid double taxation.4 Tax treaties also 
provide for the resolution of double taxation disputes through an administrative 
procedure, known as the mutual agreement procedure, that in some treaties is 
complemented by a mandatory binding arbitration procedure.5 The ultimate object 
and purpose of IIAs and tax treaties is to remove barriers to international trade and 
impediments to economic growth.
In addition to their common object and purpose, the investment treaty network and 
the tax treaty network share a similar size, in that each comprises more than 3,000 
treaties. The provisions of IIAs and tax treaties generally are highly customized on 
the basis of the investment flows and economic interests of the contracting States. 
Therefore, the provisions found in IIAs and tax treaties vary considerably. The number 
of treaties in force in the investment treaty network and the tax treaty network, 
and the customization of the treaty provisions potentially turn the amendment of 
these treaty networks in their entirety into a cumbersome and long process. To 
modify the treaty networks in a swift and coordinated manner, the investment treaty 
makers and the tax treaty makers almost contemporaneously developed the idea 
of implementing treaty changes through a single multilateral convention. 
After recognizing the need for provisions on transparency in the resolution of treaty-
based investor–State disputes to account for the public interest involved in such 
1 http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (consulted on 8 June 2017).
2 These rights include the right to not have investments unlawfully expropriated, the right to fair and 
equitable treatment, rights against discrimination in the forms of national and most-favored-nation 
treatments, and the right to free transfer of capital. For more details, see, for example, Davie, “Taxation 
Based Investment Treaty Claims”, 8 Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2015), at 202.
3 Boyarsky, “Transparency in Investor-State Arbitration”, 21 Dispute Resolution Magazine (Summer 
2015), at 34. 
4 However, the State of source and the State of residence frequently share taxing rights over the so-
called passive income, e.g. dividends, interests and royalties.
5 The number of tax treaties that provide for mandatory binding arbitration procedure is limited since the 
mandatory binding arbitration procedure clause was introduced – in paragraph 5 of Article 25 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention – only in 2008. Moreover, less developed economies in general reject 
the introduction of a mandatory arbitration procedure in their tax treaties, an action based in part on 
the argument that the notion of fiscal sovereignty does not allow for a third-party arbitrator to decide 
on tax-sovereign matters such as tax disputes.
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arbitration procedures, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) enacted on 1 April 2014 the Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based 
Investor-State Arbitration (The Rules on Transparency).6 These Rules provide for 
the transparency and accessibility of treaty-based investor–State arbitration to the 
public. However, the Rules on Transparency can apply only to disputes arising out 
of IIAs concluded on or after 1 April 2014. To address the lack of transparency 
in investor–State arbitration procedures in IIAs concluded before 1 April 2014, 
the United Nations adopted the Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based 
Investor–State Arbitration (the Mauritius Convention).7 The Mauritius Convention 
thus allows its parties to apply the Rules on Transparency to disputes arising out of 
IIAs concluded before 1 April 2014. 
The Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)8 Project of the G20 and the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) derived from a public urge to 
counter tax planning practices, undertaken mainly by multinational enterprises that 
despite obtaining high income in certain jurisdictions paid almost no corporate taxes 
therein. The discussions on BEPS showed that eliminating such practices would 
require changes to tax treaties. On 24 November 2016, the Multilateral Convention 
to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS (the Multilateral Tax 
Instrument) was concluded to implement the required changes in tax treaties.9 
This article aims to clarify how the Multilateral Tax Instrument and the Mauritius 
Convention modify treaties. It also aims to draw lessons from the analysis of both 
multilateral conventions that might be of benefit for future modifications of an 
extensive number of treaties through a single instrument. As already advocated in 
the World Investment Report 2015, policymakers who engage in the discussions 
of changes to IIAs and to tax treaties should consider the impact that these treaties 
have on investment and adopt coordinated solutions.10 This article shows that the 
techniques to modify both kinds of treaties lately used by policymakers are similar. 
Thus, if the Multilateral Tax Instrument and the Mauritius Convention turn to be 
successful, coordinated solutions could be simultaneously implemented in tax 
treaties and IIAs through a single multilateral treaty that could modify all of them. 
To this end, section 2 introduces the G20/OECD BEPS Project and the Multilateral 
6 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/68/109, 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-
Transparency-E.pdf (consulted on 8 June 2018).
7 United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State (10 October 2014).
8 The OECD has defined BEPS as referring to “tax avoidance strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches 
in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations”; available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/
beps/ (consulted on 8 June 2018).
9 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (24 November 2016).
10 UNCTAD; World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance. New York 
and Geneva: United Nations; at 209.
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Tax Instrument in more detail. Section 3 summarizes the techniques used in the 
Multilateral Tax Instrument to modify tax treaties, and section 4 summarizes the 
techniques used in the Mauritius Convention to modify IIAs. Section 5 compares 
the two multilateral conventions and draws lessons from the analysis of both. 
Section 6 concludes and draws lessons. 
2.  The G20/OECD BEPS Project and the Multilateral Tax 
Instrument
Taking advantage of the lack of coordination of the international tax rules and 
domestic tax systems, many taxpayers, particularly multinational enterprises, 
exploit arbitrages in tax treaties and domestic tax laws to reduce their worldwide tax 
burden. The recurring discussion in the public media of this phenomenon shaped 
a collective indignation that resulted in the perfect momentum for a multilateral 
reaction of the G20 and the OECD members. On 12 February 2013, the OECD 
released its report on BEPS. The report recognized that BEPS “constitute a risk 
to tax revenues, tax sovereignty and tax fairness for OECD member countries and 
non-members alike”11 and, therefore, concluded that a multilateral and coordinated 
response to this phenomenon was needed. 
Subsequently, on 19 July 2013, an action plan with 15 action points was published. 
The BEPS Action Plan set the stage for policy recommendations to eliminate the 
flaws detected in the international and domestic tax systems. The last action point, 
BEPS Action 15, referred to the development of a multilateral treaty to modify the 
entire tax treaty network. The purpose of BEPS Action 15 was summarized in the 
following terms: 
Analyze the tax and public international law issues related to the 
development of a Multilateral Instrument to enable jurisdictions that wish 
to do so to implement measures developed in the course of the work 
on BEPS and amend bilateral tax treaties. On the basis of this analysis, 
interested Parties will develop a Multilateral Instrument designed to 
provide an innovative approach to international tax matters, reflecting 
the rapidly evolving nature of the global economy and the need to adapt 
quickly to this evolution.12
On 14 September 2014, a deliverable on BEPS Action 15 was published.13 On 
5 October 2015, the deliverable was released with very few changes as the Final 
11 OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013), at 5.
12 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013), at 24.
13 OECD, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties – Action 15: Deliverable 
(2014).
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Report on BEPS Action 15.14 In it, the OECD concluded that developing a multilateral 
instrument to update the tax treaty network was desirable and feasible.15 Moreover, 
the OECD indicated that in the context of the BEPS Project a multilateral instrument 
was an essential tool, since it would swiftly eliminate the flaws detected in the tax 
treaty network that allow multinationals to implement BEPS practices.16 
The OECD’s plan of concluding the Multilateral Tax Instrument was based on the 
idea that renegotiating and amending all the tax treaties in force would demand a 
monumental effort. And, the time required to amend the entire tax treaty network 
most probably would play against the BEPS Project. The longer that updating the 
tax treaty network were to take, the longer taxpayers could continue to exploit 
arbitrages in tax treaties and domestic tax laws. Moreover, if updating the tax 
treaty network were to take too long, the political willingness to do so might 
vanish. The Multilateral Tax Instrument, in principle, would allow the speedy and 
synchronized modification of the tax treaty network. In addition, it would result in 
uniform international tax rules designed to counter BEPS practices, avoiding the 
proliferation of uncoordinated unilateral or bilateral tax measures.17
On 6 February 2015, the OECD issued a mandate to launch the negotiations on the 
Multilateral Tax Instrument.18 On 27 May 2015, an ad hoc Group independent from 
the OECD was created to negotiate the Multilateral Tax Instrument.19 In general, 
the ad hoc Group was in charge only of designing the instrument – i.e. negotiating 
the form of the provisions of the Multilateral Tax Instrument – as its substance 
was already agreed. Indeed, the substance of the provisions of the Multilateral Tax 
Instrument was agreed and published in the 2015 Final Reports on BEPS Action 
2, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements;20 BEPS Action 6, 
14 OECD, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties – Action 15: Final Report 
(2015).
15 OECD, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties – Action 15: Final Report 
(2015), at 17.
16 OECD, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties – Action 15: Final Report 
(2015), at 16.
17 OECD, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties – Action 15: Final Report 
(2015), at 16.
18 OECD, Action 15: A Mandate for the Development of a Multilateral Instrument on Tax Treaty Measures 
to Tackle BEPS (2015).
19 OECD, “Work Underway for the Development of the BEPS Multilateral Instrument” (28 May 2015), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/work-underway-for-the-development-of-the-beps-
multilateral-instrument.htm (consulted on 18 June 2018).
20 OECD, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements – Action 2: Final Report (2015). 
Action 2 of the BEPS Project tries to establish a common approach to hybrid mismatch arrangements 
to prevent cases of double non-taxation. Among others, this Action establishes rules that seek to 
eliminate the tax benefits of mismatches, end the use of multiple deductions for a single expense and 
end the generation of multiple foreign tax credits for one amount of foreign tax paid.
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Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances;21 BEPS 
Action 7, Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status;22 
and BEPS Action 14, Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective.23 
Within the ad hoc Group, a sub-group on arbitration was created to produce the 
form and substance of the provisions on a mandatory binding arbitration procedure, 
which were not discussed in the course of other Actions of the BEPS Project owing 
to the lack of support for it of many of the participants.24 
The ad hoc Group started its substantive work in November 2015. More than 
100 States and non-State jurisdictions, including not only OECD members, G20 
countries and other developed countries but also many developing countries, 
participated in the negotiation of the Multilateral Tax Instrument. Also, international 
organizations were represented in the negotiations. 
The negotiation process lasted for almost a year and a half. During this period, 
a public consultation was launched to obtain input from civil society on what 
technical issues would arise from implementing the Multilateral Tax Instrument, 
in their view, and how to overcome them.25 In addition, during this period, so-
called speed matching sessions took place between the parties to the tax treaties 
subject to modification. In those sessions, the parties discussed and matched their 
positions on the application of the provisions of the Multilateral Tax Instrument to 
their common tax treaties. As the instrument implements a complicated system of 
opting-ins, alternative provisions and reservations, the speed matching sessions 
21 OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances – Action 6: Final 
Report (2015). Action 6 tries to prevent treaty abuse, including the implementation of treaty-shopping 
strategies. For such a purpose, Action 6 includes several provisions, some of which are presented as 
alternatives to each other (although they can also complement each other), as is the case with the 
general anti-avoidance rule, known as the principal purposes test or PPT, and the specific anti-abuse 
rule that limits treaty benefits to taxpayers that do not fulfil certain objective predetermined conditions, 
known as the Limitation on Benefits or LoB. 
22 OECD, Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status – Action 7: Final 
Report (2015). Action 7 suggests updating the concept of permanent establishment. The changes 
suggested in Action 7 addresses techniques used to inappropriately avoid the tax nexus, including 
the replacement of distributors with commissionaire arrangements or the artificial fragmentation of 
business activities.
23 OECD, Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective – Action 14: Final Report (2015). 
Action 14 suggests changes to the mutual agreement procedure in order to provide taxpayers with 
a more effective and timely resolution of their tax disputes. It also suggested the implementation of a 
mandatory binding arbitration procedure.
24 Although more than 45 countries actively participated in the BEPS Project, only 20 agreed to 
implementing mandatory binding arbitration in their tax treaties. The participants that committed to 
mandatory binding arbitration are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. See OECD, Making Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms More Effective, Action 14: Final Report (2015), at 41.
25 OECD, “OECD releases discussion draft on the multilateral instrument to implement the tax-treaty 
related BEPS measures” (31 May 2016), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/discussion-
draft-beps-multilateral-instrument.htm (consulted on 8 June 2018).
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had the purpose of ensuring agreements between the parties to tax treaties on the 
forms in which their tax treaty relations would be modified through this instrument. 
The Multilateral Tax Instrument was concluded on 24 November 2016, and on 7 
June 2017 a signing ceremony was held. During the signing ceremony ministers 
and high-level officials from 68 States and non-State jurisdictions signed or formally 
expressed their intention to sign the Multilateral Tax Instrument.26 The signing 
ceremony was ground-breaking for two reasons: the Multilateral Tax Instrument 
is the first multilateral treaty of its kind in the international tax law arena, and the 
support expressed by States was tremendous, especially considering that all 
previous worldwide initiatives to coordinate international tax rules related to the 
allocation of taxing rights had failed.27 
Since the signing ceremony, other States have signed the Multilateral Tax Instrument 
or have expressed their intention to do so.28 As of 29 June 2018, the Multilateral Tax 
Instrument had 82 parties and signatories. Nine of them have ratified the Multilateral 
Tax Instrument and notified their final positions on the application of the provisions 
of the instrument.29 The Multilateral Tax Instrument entered into force on 1 July 
2018, and it will start producing effects as from 1 January 2019. 
3.  Techniques used in the Multilateral Tax Instrument to modify 
tax treaties
The object and purpose of the Multilateral Tax Instrument is to swiftly incorporate 
into the tax treaty network the treaty changes proposed in the course of the 
BEPS Project.30 The scope of the Multilateral Tax Instrument has been established 
in its Article 1 in the following terms: “This Convention modifies all Covered Tax 
Agreements as defined in subparagraph a) of paragraph 1 of Article 2 (Interpretation 
of Terms).” According to Article 2(1)(a) of the Multilateral Tax Instrument, a Covered 
26 OECD, “Ground-breaking multilateral BEPS convention signed at OECD will close loopholes in 
thousands of tax treaties worldwide” (7 June 2017), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/ground-
breaking-multi lateral-beps-convention-will-close-tax-treaty-loopholes.htm (consulted on 8 June 
2018).
27 As, for example, the United Nations initiatives developed between the 1920s and the 1950s and the 
OECD initiatives developed between the 1950s and the 1960s.
28 OECD, “Major step forward in international tax co-operation as additional countries sign landmark 
agreement to strengthen tax treaties” (24 Jan. 2018), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/major-
step-forward-in-international-tax-cooperation-as-additional-countries-sign-landmark-agreement-to-
strengthen-tax-treaties.htm (consulted on 8 June 2018).
29 Signatories and Parties to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to 
Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, Status as of 29 June 2018. http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/
beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf (consulted on 29 June 2018).
30 OECD, Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Tax Instrument (2016), para. 14.
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Tax Agreement is a treaty for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes 
on income in force between two or more parties to the Multilateral Tax Instrument 
as long as each of the parties has notified it as a treaty covered by the Multilateral 
Tax Instrument.
The definition of Covered Tax Agreement thus contains two conditions, both of 
which must be fulfilled. First, the treaty must have been concluded with the intention 
of avoiding double taxation with respect to taxes on income, and it must be in force 
between two or more parties. Second, each of the parties to the tax treaty must 
have sent a notification to the depositary listing this tax treaty and any amending 
or accompanying instruments thereto as a Covered Tax Agreement. Only if both 
conditions are fulfilled may the respective tax treaty be considered a Covered Tax 
Agreement subject to modification through the Multilateral Tax Instrument.31 
The Multilateral Tax Instrument reflects a positive-listing approach, as its parties 
must notify the tax treaties they are willing to modify. In this sense, the Multilateral 
Tax Instrument provides States with flexibility, since they do not need to notify all 
their tax treaties as Covered Tax Agreements. As a consequence, not all the tax 
treaties of the parties to the Multilateral Tax Instrument will necessarily be modified 
through the instrument. The Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Tax Instrument 
indicates that this flexible approach was adopted because parties may prefer to 
renegotiate some tax treaties on a bilateral basis or because a tax treaty may have 
been recently renegotiated and already implements the anti-BEPS measures.32 On 
the basis of the tax treaty network of the members of the ad hoc Group, the OECD 
initially estimated that more than 2,000 tax treaties could be modified through the 
Multilateral Tax Instrument.33 However, a review of the notifications sent by the 
parties and signatories to the depositary as of 29 June 2018 shows that from the 
total of 2,563 tax treaties notified, only 1,367 tax treaties have been notified by all 
their contracting States as Covered Tax Agreements.34 Thus, only 1,367 Covered 
Tax Agreements will be modified through the Multilateral Tax Instrument once the 
instrument enters into force for the respective parties. However, the possibility that 
the parties to the Multilateral Tax Instrument will notify other tax treaties – whether 
entered into force before or after the Multilateral Tax Instrument – as Covered Tax 
Agreements should not be underestimated. 
31 For more details, see Damberger, “Scope of the Multilateral Instrument”, in The OECD Multilateral 
Instrument for Tax Treaties – Analysis and Effects (M. Lang et al., eds., Wolters Kluwer, 2018), at 4-14.
32 OECD, Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Tax Instrument (2016), para. 26.
33 OECD, “Countries adopt multilateral convention to close tax treaty loopholes and improve functioning 
of international tax system”, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/countries-adopt-multilateral-
convention-to-close-tax-treaty-loopholes-and-improve-functioning-of-international-tax-system.htm 
(consulted on 8 June 2018).
34 OECD, MLI Database – Matrix of options and reservations, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/
treaties/mli-database-matrix-options-and-reservations.htm (consulted on 30 June 2018). 
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The general rule of the Multilateral Tax Instrument is that its parties are bound by the 
entire instrument unless the parties make a reservation. However, all the provisions 
of the Multilateral Tax Instrument providing for anti-BEPS measures are subject to 
reservations. In addition, the Multilateral Tax Instrument provides for some opting-
in mechanisms in the form of unilateral declarations and alternative provisions that 
apply only if the parties expressly opt in to such optional or alternative provisions.35 
The objective of the tax treaty makers was to provide for a high level of flexibility so 
that all States and non-State jurisdictions interested in fighting BEPS could join the 
Multilateral Tax Instrument so as to swiftly implement the anti-BEPS measures into 
their tax treaty network despite their different tax policies and economic interests.36 
As a consequence, the Multilateral Tax Instrument, to a great extent, favors universal 
participation over the integrity of its text.
Nonetheless, the treaty makers have adopted several measures to ensure a certain 
level of coordination in the implementation of the provisions of the Multilateral Tax 
Instrument. For example, with the exception of the reservations on the scope of the 
cases subject to mandatory binding arbitration,37 each of the provisions establishing 
anti-BEPS measures lists the only reservations that parties and signatories can 
make and precludes them from making any reservations not listed.38 Therefore, 
although parties do not need to accept all the commitments provided in the 
Multilateral Tax Instrument to fight BEPS practices, they can exclude or modify 
the effects of the provisions of the Multilateral Tax Instrument only by making the 
reservations that were acceptable for the tax treaty makers from an international 
tax policy perspective in the fight against BEPS. If parties avail themselves of the 
flexibility provided by the tax treaty makers and reserve the application of some 
of the rules of the Multilateral Tax Instrument, they will not adopt all the rules of 
the instrument. However, they still will implement coordinated rules across the tax 
treaty network, instead of unilateral or bilateral measures.
The coordinating effect of the Multilateral Tax Instrument is even more obvious 
when one considers that reservations apply to all the Covered Tax Agreements 
35 For details on the functioning of the opting-in mechanisms in the Multilateral Tax Instrument, see 
Miladinovic and Rust, “Options under the Multilateral Instrument”, in The OECD Multilateral Instrument 
for Tax Treaties – Analysis and Effects (M. Lang et al., eds., Wolter Kluwer, 2018), at 139-164.
36 OECD, Frequently Asked Questions on the Multilateral Instrument, available at http://www.oecd.
org/ tax/treaties/MLI-frequently-asked-questions.pdf (consulted on 18 June 2018). 
37 Unlike in the rest of its provisions, the Multilateral Tax Instrument does not include an exhaustive list 
of defined reservations that States can make in connection with the scope of the mandatory binding 
arbitration procedure. Article 28(2) sets out that a State “may formulate one or more reservations 
with respect to the scope of cases that shall be eligible for arbitration under the provisions of Part VI 
(Arbitration)”. States are, therefore, free to decide on the scope of the cases subject to arbitration.
38 Article 28(1) of the Multilateral Tax Instrument states that “Subject to paragraph 2, no reservations may 
be made to this Convention except those expressly permitted by:” and continues by listing each of the 
paragraphs of the provisions of the instrument that exhaustively list the permitted reservations.
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of a reserving party.39 Thus, when parties decide on their reservations, they must 
make decisions based on tax policy rather than on their economic interests vis-
à-vis other parties to a Covered Tax Agreement. This feature of the reservations 
should contribute to the creation of an international tax playing field and avoid the 
creation of new disparities that could be used for BEPS practices. Opting-ins and 
alternative provisions established in the Multilateral Tax Instrument also, in general, 
apply to all the Covered Tax Agreements of the party that declares to opt in to those 
provisions.40 It is expected that the coordinated implementation of the BEPS tax 
treaty output will diminish the competitive advantages or disadvantages derived 
from the use of certain tax treaties and, consequently, diminish treaty-shopping and 
tax arbitrage opportunities.41 
The Multilateral Tax Instrument can attain further coordination of the tax treaty 
network if its parties decide in the future to opt in to some of the optional provisions 
or alternative provisions. That can also be the case if parties decide to withdraw 
or replace some of their reservations by a new formulation having a more limited 
scope.42 In this sense, a party that may be initially skeptical about the application 
of certain provisions of the instrument can change its position in the future 
and further modify its tax treaties by opting in to a provision or withdrawing or 
replacing a reservation. This is particularly relevant for the provisions setting out the 
mandatory binding arbitration procedure. As mentioned earlier, the implementation 
of a mandatory binding arbitration procedure did not receive broad support from 
the participants in the BEPS Project, nor did it receive broad support from the 
members of the ad hoc Group that negotiated the Multilateral Tax Instrument. 
Therefore, the provisions setting out the mandatory binding arbitration procedure 
are optional, which means that parties must opt in to their application. As of 29 
June 2018, of the 82 parties and signatories of the Multilateral Tax Instrument, only 
28 have opted in to the application of the mandatory binding arbitration procedure. 
39 This effect of the reservations of the Multilateral Instrument is found in Article 28(8), according to which 
“a list of agreements notified pursuant to clause ii) of subparagraph a) of paragraph 1 of Article 2 
(Interpretation of Terms) that are within the scope of the reservation as defined in the relevant provision 
(and, in the case of a reservation under any of the following provisions other than those listed in 
subparagraphs c), d) and n), the article and paragraph number of each relevant provision) must be 
provided when such reservations are made…”
40 The only exceptions to this rule can be found in Article 5, dealing with the application of methods for 
the elimination of double taxation and in Articles 18 to 26, dealing with mandatory binding arbitration, 
particularly in connection with Covered Tax Agreements that already provide for mandatory binding 
arbitration of unresolved issues arising from a mutual agreement procedure case, as they can be 
excluded from the scope of the Multilateral Tax Instrument through reservations. For more details, see 
Articles 5(8), (9) and 26(4) of the Multilateral Tax Instrument. 
41 In this sense, see Helminen, The Nordic Multilateral Tax Treaty as a Model for a Multilateral EU Tax 
Treaty (IBFD, 2014), at 6, which discusses the coordinating effects of multilateral tax treaties in general. 
42 For more details, see Walker, “Reservations to the Multilateral Instrument”, in The OECD Multilateral 
Instrument for Tax Treaties – Analysis and Effects (M. Lang et al., eds., Wolters Kluwer, 2018), at 186-
189. 
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However, if objections commonly made against the implementation of a mandatory 
binding arbitration procedure can be overcome by, for example, ensuring affordable 
proceedings, providing competent tax authorities with expertise and having access 
to unbiased arbitrators, more parties to the Multilateral Tax Instrument – especially 
less developed countries43 – may be willing to accept the arbitration procedure in 
their tax treaty relations and, therefore, opt in to those provisions of the Multilateral 
Tax Instrument. 
The provisions of the Multilateral Tax Instrument providing for anti-BEPS measures 
bind only those parties that have previously concluded a Covered Tax Agreement. 
Thus, the provisions of the Multilateral Tax Instrument modify the provisions of the 
Covered Tax Agreements without changing their bilateral structure and reciprocal 
effects.44 After the Multilateral Tax Instrument enters into force, the obligations to 
avoid double taxation, whether by exempting certain items of income or by giving a 
credit for the tax paid in another State, will continue to be binary; that is, between 
a State of residence and a State of source. The exact form in which the provisions 
of the tax treaties will be modified through the Multilateral Tax Instrument is set out 
in compatibility or conflict clauses that interact with notification clauses and the 
notifications made by the parties.
The Multilateral Tax Instrument also includes compatibility clauses in each of its 
provisions establishing anti-BEPS measures.45 The compatibility clauses describe 
the provisions of the Covered Tax Agreements that are subject to modification. 
Through such descriptions the tax treaty makers try to overcome the difficulties 
deriving from the fact that, owing to customization, Covered Tax Agreements may 
use different terminology and have different enumeration styles, different wording 
and even different scopes. In addition, the compatibility clauses prescribe the effects 
of the provisions they relate to on the provisions of the Covered Tax Agreements.46 
43 On these matters, see Owens, Gildemeister and Turcan, “Proposal for a New Institutional Framework 
for Mandatory Dispute Resolution”, 82 Tax Notes International (2016), and United Nations – 
Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, Secretariat Paper on Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in Taxation, E/C.18/2015/CRP.8 (2015), http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/
uploads/2015/10/11STM_CRP8_DisputeResolution.pdf (consulted on 18 June 2018). 
44 Exceptionally the provisions of Article 5 and some of the provisions of Article 7 of the Multilateral Tax 
Instrument may be applied by only one of the parties to a Covered Tax Agreement. However, agreement 
of the other parties to the respective Covered Tax Agreement is required so that the provisions of the 
Multilateral Tax Instrument can be applied unilaterally. 
45 Except for the compatibility clause dealing with the mandatory binding arbitration procedure, which is 
established in Article 26 but applies to the entire Part VI of the Multilateral Tax Instrument. 
46  For details on compatibility clauses, see Bravo, “The Multilateral Tax Instrument and Its Relationship 
with Tax Treaties”, 8 World Tax Journal 3 (2016), at 285-287 and 296-300, and Govind and Pistone, 
“The Relationship Between Tax Treaties and the Multilateral Instrument: Compatibility Clauses in the 
Multilateral Instrument” in The OECD Multilateral Instrument for Tax Treaties: Analysis and Effects (M. 
Lang et al., eds., Wolters Kluwer, 2018), at 118-122. 
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These effects may be to replace, to change the scope of application, to supplement 
or to supersede.47 
The exact effect of the provisions of the Multilateral Tax Instrument on the provisions 
of a Covered Tax Agreement depends on the content of the latter, on the fact 
that none of the parties has made a reservation (or that all of them have opted 
in to the application of the provision) and on whether parties have notified that a 
similar provision exists or does not exist in the Covered Tax Agreement. Indeed, 
as mentioned earlier, the compatibility clauses of the Multilateral Tax Instrument 
interact with the notification clauses also found in each provision of the Multilateral 
Tax Instrument establishing anti-BEPS measures and the notifications made by 
the parties. These notifications ensure that parties agree on which provisions of 
their Covered Tax Agreement are or are not subject to modification through the 
Multilateral Tax Instrument. Even though the compatibility clauses interacting with 
the notification clauses and the notifications made by the parties may produce 
different effects (e.g. replace, change the scope of application, supplement or 
supersede), one should not lose sight of the fact that all of the compatibility clauses 
claim that the provisions of the Multilateral Tax Instrument must always prevail over 
those of the Covered Tax Agreements. The fact that all the compatibility clauses 
claim the prevalence of the Multilateral Tax Instrument is logical considering that 
the main object and purpose of this instrument is to modify the Covered Tax 
Agreements.
4. Techniques used in the Mauritius Convention to modify IIAs
The Mauritius Convention was adopted by the United Nations in its resolution 
69/116 of 10 December 2014.48 After a signing ceremony in Mauritius on 17 
March 2015 and following ratification by Canada, Mauritius and Switzerland, the 
Mauritius Convention entered into force on 18 October 2017.49 According to its 
47  The Multilateral Tax Instrument uses four types of compatibility clauses: (i) “in place of”, (ii) “applies to” 
or “modifies”, (iii) “in the absence of” and (iv) “in place of or in the absence of”.
48 Resolution 69/116 adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 2014 [on the report of the 
Sixth Committee (A/69/496)], available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/docs/A_RES_69_116-E.
pdf (consulted on 8 June 2018).
49 For more information, see “The United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-
State Arbitration will enter into force in six months after ratification by Switzerland”, available at http://
www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2017/unisl244.html (consulted on 18 June 2018). Another 
23 States have signed the Mauritius Convention since it was opened for signature on 17 March 2015. 
However, they have not completed the ratification process; see http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency_Convention_status.html (consulted on 18 June 2018). 
Also, UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor No. 17, at 11 (March 2017), and UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note 
No. 1, at 11 (March 2016), both available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ (consulted on 18 
June 2018).
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preamble, the Mauritius Convention implements the Rules on Transparency in the 
investment treaty network with the purpose of contributing to the establishment of 
a harmonized legal framework for a fair and efficient settlement of investor–State 
disputes. The Mauritius Convention produces its effects irrespective of whether an IIA 
provides for arbitration rules or procedures different than the UNCITRAL arbitration 
rules. In particular, the Rules on Transparency “provide for the public release of 
information and documents generated as part of investment treaty arbitrations as 
well as the capacity for non-disputing third parties to attend or even participate in 
the proceedings.”50 As the Rules on Transparency were enacted by UNCITRAL 
on 1 April 2014, the Mauritius Convention, like the Multilateral Tax Instrument, 
implements rules whose substance was previously agreed by consensus. 
The Mauritius Convention establishes that all the IIAs of the parties – which include 
not only States but also regional economic integration organizations – concluded 
before 1 April 2014 will be modified through the Convention, unless they make a 
reservation. If reservations are not made by the parties, all their IIAs will be modified 
through the Convention in order to apply the Rules on Transparency to investor–
State arbitration procedures to which they are a party as long as the investor’s host 
State is also a party to the Convention (bilateral or multilateral application), or the 
investor has agreed on the application of the Rules on Transparency after an offer 
made by the respondent State (unilateral application).51
Hence, the Mauritius Convention – unlike the Multilateral Tax Instrument – takes 
a negative-listing approach. In their reservations, parties must identify IIAs by title 
and by the name of the contracting States, to exclude them from the scope of 
application of the Convention. As a consequence, not all the IIAs of the parties to 
the Mauritius Convention concluded before 1 April 2014 will necessarily be modified 
through that Convention. Therefore, the negative-listing approach adopted in the 
Mauritius Convention also provides States with flexibility, as they do not need to 
implement the Rules on Transparency in all their IIAs. 
The Mauritius Convention also allows a party to reserve the right not to apply the 
Rules on Transparency to an investor–State arbitration procedure in which it is a 
respondent if such an arbitration procedure is conducted using a specific set of 
arbitration rules or procedures other than the UNCITRAL arbitration rules,52 e.g. 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention and the 
Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce. It also allows a party 
to reserve the right to exclude unilateral offers to investors of the application of the 
50 Shirlow, “Three Manifestations of Transparency in International Investment Law: A Story of Sources, 
Stakeholders and Structures”, 8 Goettingen Journal of International Law 73 (2017), at 87-88.
51 See Article 2 of the Mauritius Convention.
52 See Article 3(1)(b) of the Mauritius Convention.
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Rules on Transparency in the context of an investor–State arbitration procedure in 
which it is a respondent,53 which means that such a party accepts only the bilateral 
or multilateral application of the Convention. Furthermore, a party to the Mauritius 
Convention can reserve the right to not automatically apply eventual modifications 
to the Rules on Transparency.54 All other reservations to the provisions of the 
Mauritius Convention are, however, precluded.55 The list of reservations included in 
Article 3 of the Mauritius Convention is exhaustive and, as is also the case with the 
Multilateral Tax Instrument, parties to the Mauritius Convention can make only the 
reservations listed therein.
Interestingly, except for the reservation on the automatic application of modifications 
to the Rules on Transparency, which must be made within six months after such 
modifications have been adopted, parties to the Mauritius Convention can make 
reservations at any time. 56 As a consequence, reservations can be made by the 
parties even after the Convention has entered into force for them, in which case 
the reservations will take effect twelve months after the date of their deposit.57 
Reservations made after the Convention has entered into force for the reserving 
party – commonly referred to in treaty law as late reservations – would, in the 
case of the Mauritius Convention, diminish the party’s commitment to ensure 
transparency in investment arbitration procedures. Indeed, late reservations would 
allow parties to stop applying the Rules on Transparency at any point in the future 
with respect to certain IIAs or certain procedures, or as a result of unilateral offers to 
investors. The possibility of formulating late reservations implies that parties to the 
Mauritius Convention may unilaterally modify the obligation to apply the Rules on 
Transparency in the future, irrespective of the position adopted by other parties to 
an IIA. Moreover, late reservations play against the establishment of a harmonized 
legal framework for the fair and efficient settlement of international investment 
disputes, as the reserving parties may restrict their obligations under the Mauritius 
Convention. 
Yet parties can also withdraw their reservations at any time, which means that 
more of their IIAs may be modified by the Mauritius Convention. A withdrawal 
of a reservation would produce the exact opposite effect of the formulation 
of a late reservation. The party withdrawing the reservation would increase its 
commitment to apply the rules of the Mauritius Convention, whether by covering 
more of its IIAs under the Convention, by accepting the application of the Rules 
on Transparency to investor–State arbitrations conducted under other arbitration 
53 See Article 3(1)(c) of the Mauritius Convention.
54 See Article 3(2) of the Mauritius Convention.
55 See Article 3(4) of the Mauritius Convention.
56 See Article 4(1) of the Mauritius Convention.
57 See Article 4(4) of the Mauritius Convention.
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rules than the UNCITRAL rules, by applying the Rules on Transparency after the 
acceptance of unilateral offers made to investors, or by accepting the application 
of further modifications to the Rules on Transparency. Likewise, the withdrawal 
of a reservation would expand a party’s commitment to ensure transparency in 
investment arbitration procedures and more thoroughly conform to the object and 
purpose of the Mauritius Convention. 
Another interesting feature of the Mauritius Convention is that it allows its parties 
to unilaterally offer the application of the Rules on Transparency to investors in 
the context of investor–State arbitration procedures arising under an IIA, even 
where their home State has not ratified the Convention.58 A unilateral offer of the 
application of the Rules on Transparency broadens the scope of application of the 
Mauritius Convention. It is not necessary that all the contracting States of an IIA 
are also parties to the Mauritius Convention for the rules of the latter to apply to 
an investor–State arbitration procedure. It is enough that the respondent State has 
ratified the Convention and has not made a reservation with respect to the right to 
unilaterally offer to an investor the application of the Rules on Transparency.59 
A unilateral offer can also be made by the respondent State to an investor when 
its home State has made a reservation excluding the respective IIA from the 
scope of application of the Mauritius Convention.60 This means that reservations 
do not reciprocally apply in all cases. Indeed, even if the host State has made a 
reservation, the Rules on Transparency may still apply to investor–State arbitrations 
if the investor accepts the unilateral offer of the respondent State.61
The Mauritius Convention does not contain detailed compatibility clauses. However, 
its Article 2(4) establishes the following:
The final sentence of article 1(7) of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency 
shall not apply to investor–State arbitrations under paragraph 1.
The final sentence of Article 1(7) of the Rules on Transparency provides that if a 
conflict between such rules and the respective IIA arises, the provisions of the IIA 
shall prevail. Article 2(4) of the Mauritius Convention thus addresses the relationship 
between the Convention and underlying IIAs by clarifying that the final sentence of 
58 Fry and Repousis, “Towards a New World for Investor–State Arbitration Through Transparency”, 48 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (2015-2016), at 839.
59  See also, Johnson, “The Mauritius Convention on Transparency: Comments on the treaty and its role 
in increasing transparency of investor–State arbitration”, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
Policy Paper (2014), at 6 and 7.
60 For more details, see Bergman, “Introductory Note to United Nations Convention on Transparency in 
Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration”, 54 International Legal Materials (2015), at 748.
61 For more details, see Johnson, “The Mauritius Convention on Transparency: Comments on the treaty 
and its role in increasing transparency of investor-State arbitration”, Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Investment Policy Paper (2014), at 11 and 12.
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Article 1(7) of the Rules on Transparency shall not apply. Accordingly, if a conflict 
of treaties between the Mauritius Convention and the Rules on Transparency, on 
the one hand, and an underlying IIA, on the other hand, arises, then the Mauritius 
Convention and the Rules on Transparency should prevail over the IIA. This result is 
a logical one, considering that the object and purpose of the Mauritius Convention 
is to update the investment treaty network in order to implement the Rules on 
Transparency in more than 3,000 IIAs.62 Moreover, this result reflects the lex posterior 
principle enshrined in Article 30(3) and (4) of the Vienna Convention.63 According 
to that principle, if the provisions of conflicting treaties cannot be implemented at 
the same time, the effects and consequences under the later treaty (the Mauritius 
Convention) must be implemented, giving them preference over the effects and 
consequences of the earlier treaty (the underlying IIA).64 
5.  Comparison between the Multilateral Tax Instrument and the 
Mauritius Convention 
The Multilateral Tax Instrument and the Mauritius Convention have similar 
characteristics as well as some differences. Those similarities and differences are 
highlighted in this section because they may be relevant for future modifications 
of an extensive number of treaties through a single multilateral instrument. They 
may also be relevant for policymakers engaged in the discussions of changes to 
IIAs and changes to tax treaties, if they decide to coordinate efforts to promote 
investment by aligning IIAs and tax treaties through a single multilateral treaty. 
The Multilateral Tax Instrument and the Mauritius Convention were designed 
as streamlined mechanisms. If these multilateral conventions are successful in 
achieving a swift modification of the treaty networks, they most probably will serve 
62 Fry and Repousis, “Towards a New World for Investor–State Arbitration Through Transparency”, 48 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (2015-2016), at 840.
63 Grinberg and Pauwelyn, “The Emergence of a New International Tax Regime: The OECD’s Package 
on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)”, 19 Insights 24 (2015), available at https://www.asil.
org/insights/volume/19/issue/24/emergence-new-international-tax-regime-oecd’s-package-base-
erosion-and (consulted on 18 June 2018); Fry and Repousis, “Towards a New World for Investor-State 
Arbitration Through Transparency”, 48 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 
(2015-2016), at 840; Johnson, “The Mauritius Convention on Transparency: Comments on the treaty 
and its role in increasing transparency of investor–State arbitration”, Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Investment Policy Paper (2014), at 5.
64 McNair, The Law of Treaties (Claredon Press, 1961), at 219 and Giegerich, “Termination or Suspension 
of the Operation of a Treaty Implied by Conclusion of a Later Treaty”, in Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (Dörr and Schmalenbach, eds., Springer-Verlag, 2012), at 1012. For a more detailed 
explanation of the use of the lex posterior principle for resolving conflicts between modifying treaties 
and modified treaties, see Bravo, “The Multilateral Tax Instrument and Its Relationship with Tax 
Treaties”, 8 World Tax Journal 3 (2016), at 287-289. 
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as models for the future. In fact, the Multilateral Tax Instrument and the Mauritius 
Convention have already inspired a study about the implementation of a permanent 
investment tribunal in treaty-based investor–State arbitration through a single 
instrument that could swiftly modify numerous IIAs.65 
The treaty makers of the Multilateral Tax Instrument and the Mauritius Convention 
sought to avoid the potential complexities of renegotiating and amending the States’ 
entire treaty networks. Another objective of the treaty makers was to implement 
uniform rules in the tax and investment treaty networks, respectively. To achieve 
these objectives, the treaty makers opted for dealing with narrow subject matters. 
Indeed, the Multilateral Tax Instrument implements only treaty rules to prevent 
BEPS and the Mauritius Convention implements only the Rules on Transparency 
relevant for investor–State arbitration procedures. By dealing with narrow subject 
matters, the treaty makers of these multilateral conventions avoided engaging in the 
negotiation of controversial treaty issues for which consensus may be more difficult 
to reach – i.e., in the case of tax treaties the allocation of income to the State of 
source or the State of residence and in the case of IIAs substantive investment 
protection standards.66 This approach allows States with different policies and 
economic interests to conclude multilateral treaties, despite of their differences.67 
To further encourage States with different policies and interests to conclude the 
Multilateral Tax Instrument and the Mauritius Convention, the treaty makers in 
both decided to provide for a high level of flexibility. As discussed in section 3, the 
Multilateral Tax Instrument combines the use of opting-ins, alternative provisions 
and reservations. Although the combined use of mechanisms to create flexibility in 
the Multilateral Tax Instrument adds complexity to its interpretation and application, 
these mechanisms are also essential tools to ensure universal participation. Without 
ensuring a high level of flexibility in the implementation of the Multilateral Tax 
Instrument, the number of signatories and parties probably would not have reached 
more than 80 States and non-State jurisdictions. Moreover, as discussed in section 
4, the Mauritius Convention provides parties with flexibility by allowing them to either 
carve out specific IIAs or carve out all IIAs that establish procedures other than the 
UNCITRAL arbitration rules. All of this shows that, although the substance of both 
65 See Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà, “Can the Mauritius Convention serve as a model for the reform of 
investor–State arbitration in connection with the introduction of a permanent investment tribunal or an 
appeal mechanism? Analysis and roadmap”, CIDS-Geneva Center for International Dispute Settlement 
(2016).
66 See Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà, “Can the Mauritius Convention serve as a model for the reform of 
investor-State arbitration in connection with the introduction of a permanent investment tribunal or an 
appeal mechanism? Analysis and roadmap”, CIDS-Geneva Center for International Dispute Settlement 
(2016), at 75-76.
67 For a similar view, see Schill, “The Mauritius Convention on Transparency: A Piece of Constitutional 
Reform of the International Investment Regime”, 16 Journal of World Investment & Trade (2015), at 202. 
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multilateral conventions was agreed by consensus in advance and that adopting 
uniform rules was part of the object and purpose of both multilateral conventions, 
ensuring flexibility was essential for the treaty makers. Probably, the treaty makers 
feared that without offering a high level of flexibility, the conventions would not be 
successful in the modification of an extensive number of treaties. In the case of the 
Multilateral Tax Instrument, the treaty makers’ fear seems to have been justified. 
Many parties and signatories have not opted in to the optional provisions, have 
chosen different alternative provisions – which means that their options are not 
always applicable to their tax treaties – and have made many reservations to limit 
the scope of the modifications applicable to their tax treaties.68 
As both multilateral conventions provide for a high level of flexibility and parties 
have availed themselves of it, large-scale harmonization of treaty rules across the 
tax treaty network and the investment treaty network will probably not be achieved. 
As a consequence of the flexibility granted by both multilateral conventions, their 
parties can modify only some of their treaties or parts of their treaties. Despite 
the existence of different sets of applicable rules in the tax treaty network and the 
investment treaty network, a certain level of coordination will still be achieved with 
these multilateral conventions because they establish an exhaustive list of permitted 
reservations. This means that the treaty makers have decided beforehand which 
reservations are acceptable from a policy perspective, avoiding that parties produce 
reservations that may be undesirable. Moreover, both multilateral conventions allow 
parties to withdraw or replace their reservations at any time as an incentive for the 
parties to further commit to the fulfillment of the conventions’ object and purpose. 
Future modifications of an extensive number of treaties through a single instrument 
should carefully balance the benefits of implementing high levels of flexibility against 
the benefits of implementing harmonized rules across the treaty network. If universal 
participation is preferred, treaty makers should give preference to flexibility over the 
harmonized implementation of the treaty rules.
Instead of directly amending each treaty, the Multilateral Tax Instrument and the 
Mauritius Convention adopted the approach establish in Article 30 of the Vienna 
Convention, which deals with successive treaties dealing with the same subject 
matter. Thus, these multilateral conventions coexist with the treaties they modify. 
Whereas the Multilateral Tax Instrument includes detailed compatibility clauses 
and notification clauses in each of its provisions establishing anti-BEPS measures 
that indicate the exact effects of those provisions on the ones of the Covered 
Tax Agreements, the Mauritius Convention follows the lex posterior principle. The 
68 The list of opting-ins, alternative provisions and reservations made by the parties and signatories of the 
Multilateral Tax Instrument is available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-
parties.pdf (consulted on 30 June 2018). 
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different techniques used by the treaty makers, however, do not produce different 
effects. Unless the parties make a reservation or do not opt in to the application of 
optional or alternative provisions, the provisions of the multilateral conventions in 
all cases prevail over the ones of the treaties they modify, by either replacing them, 
modifying their scope of application or supplementing them.
Another difference between the Multilateral Tax Instrument and the Mauritius 
Convention is the approach used to determine their scope of application. However, 
as with the use of compatibility clauses combined with the use of notification 
clauses or the use of the lex posterior principle instead, the different approaches to 
determine the scope of application of the conventions implemented by the treaty 
makers also produce similar effects. The Multilateral Tax Instrument uses a positive-
listing approach to determine the tax treaties that will be modified. Thus, to be 
subject to modification through the Multilateral Tax Instrument, all the parties to a 
tax treaty must notify it as a Covered Tax Agreement. The positive-listing approach 
adopted in the Multilateral Tax Instrument is the opposite of the negative-listing 
approach adopted in the Mauritius Convention. Indeed, under the Mauritius 
Convention all the IIAs of the parties concluded before 1 April 2014 will be modified 
unless at least one of their parties makes a reservation. Consequently, under both 
multilateral conventions, their parties have the freedom to exclude the treaties that 
they do not want to modify. 
Although similar effects can be achieved by using the positive-listing approach or 
the negative-listing approach to determine the scope of application of a modifying 
multilateral convention, the author believes that the positive-listing approach 
adopted by the treaty makers of the Multilateral Tax Instrument may have an 
advantage over the use of the negative-listing approach. The advantage is that 
parties to the Multilateral Tax Instrument may notify future tax treaties as Covered 
Tax Agreements. This means that if those parties conclude new tax treaties without 
implementing all or some of the BEPS tax treaty output, pursuant to Article 29(5),69 
they can notify those tax treaties as Covered Tax Agreements to modify them 
through the Multilateral Tax Instrument so as to implement the anti-BEPS measures. 
Conversely, under the Mauritius Convention, parties cannot modify future IIAs 
because the convention can apply only in respect of treaties concluded before 1 
April 2014. Thus, the Mauritius Convention cannot have effect on future IIAs.70 This 
approach might be sound, because the Rules on Transparency are supposed to 
69 Article 29(5) of the Multilateral Tax Instrument states:
A Party may extend at any time the list of agreements notified under clause ii) of subparagraph a) 
of paragraph 1 of Article 2 (Interpretation of Terms) by means of a notification addressed to the 
Depositary.
70 See also Schill, “The Mauritius Convention on Transparency: A Piece of Constitutional Reform of the 
International Investment Regime”, 16 Journal of World Investment & Trade (2015), at 203. 
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apply to all IIAs concluded after 1 April of 2014. However, if future modifications of 
an exhaustive number of treaties through a single instrument intend to turn political 
commitments into mandatory treaty rules, they should consider the advantages of 
adopting a positive-listing approach over a negative-listing approach.
The Mauritius Convention may apply as a consequence of a unilateral offer of one 
of the parties to an investor. Therefore, an agreement between all the parties to an 
IIA is not necessary in order for the Rules on Transparency to apply to investor–
State arbitration procedures. In the case of the Multilateral Tax Instrument, the 
unilateral application of treaty provisions is not possible without the agreement of all 
the parties to a Covered Tax Agreement. Some provisions may be applied by only 
one of the parties to a Covered Tax Agreement. However, this is possible only if the 
rest of the parties to that Covered Tax Agreement have previously agreed to such a 
result. The agreement of the rest of the parties to a Covered Tax Agreements results 
from the absence of a reservation rejecting the unilateral application of the treaty 
rule by the other party or from not opting in to the application of the same rule or a 
similar rule offered as an alternative in the Multilateral Tax Instrument.71 
Finally, the Multilateral Tax Instrument allows parties to make late reservations in 
very few circumstances. Two reasons might explain the limitations on formulating 
late reservations. First, treaty makers may have felt that it was necessary to prevent 
parties from reducing their commitments to counter BEPS practices after they 
have accepted to tackle them through the Multilateral Tax Instrument. Second, 
limiting the formulation of late reservations avoids the possibility that a party could 
unilaterally modify the application of the Multilateral Instrument on a Covered Tax 
Agreement. Unilateral modifications would most probably affect the decisions 
taken by the other contracting States to a Covered Tax Agreement without their 
consent in order to tolerate BEPS opportunities, which might go against their will. 
Conversely, under the Mauritius Convention the practice of making late reservations 
is accepted, probably because the unilateral application of the Convention is also 
accepted. Again, in the case of future modifications of an exhaustive number of 
treaties through a single instrument, the treaty makers should carefully consider 
whether the nature of the treaty obligations is compatible with the formulation of 
late reservations or not and decide whether to permit such a practice. 
The common characteristics of the Multilateral Tax Instrument and the Mauritius 
Convention as well as their differences are summarized in table 1.
71 For details, see Articles 5 and 7 of the Multilateral Tax Instrument. 
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Table 1. Comparison of the two conventions
Multilateral Tax Instrument Mauritius Convention
Substantive or material 
provisions agreed before 
the negotiation of the 
multilateral treaty 
Yes Yes
Adopted with the object 
and purpose of modifying 
treaties and improving 
the coordination of the 
provisions found in the 
bilateral treaty networks
Yes Yes
Obligation to modify all the 
treaties of the parties to the 
multilateral convention
No. The Multilateral Tax Instrument 
adopted for this purpose a positive-
listing approach. That is, the parties 
must list the treaties that will be 
modified through the convention.
No. The Mauritius Convention adopted 
for this purpose a negative-listing 
approach. That is, the parties must 
make reservations to avoid the 
application of the convention to certain 
treaties.
Possibility of making 
reservations
Yes. However, the parties can make 
only the reservations expressly 
established in the text of the 
convention. All other reservations are 
precluded.
Yes. However, the parties can make 
only the reservations expressly 
established in the text of the 
convention. All other reservations are 
precluded.
Possibility to make 
reservations at any time
Reservations can be made until 
the party deposits its instrument of 
ratification. However, parties can opt in 
to the application of optional provisions 
and alternative provisions after the 
convention has entered into force 
for them. As a consequence of a late 
opting-in, the party will increase its 
treaty commitments.
Reservations can be made after the 
Convention has entered into force for 
the parties. As a consequence of a late 
reservation the party will reduce its 
commitment to applying the rules of 
the convention.
Possibility to withdraw 
reservations
It is possible to withdraw reservations 
at any time. As a consequence of the 
withdrawal the party increases its 
commitment to apply the rules of the 
convention.
It is possible to withdraw reservations 
at any time. As a consequence of the 
withdrawal the party increases its 
commitment to apply the rules of the 
convention.
Possibility to unilaterally 
apply the provisions of the 
convention
Only exceptionally. This is only possible 
if the rest of the parties to the Covered 
Tax Agreement have previously agreed 
to it.
It is always possible after the party has 
made a unilateral offer to the investor 
and the investor has accepted it.
Definition of the relation 
between the convention and 
the treaties it modifies
Compatibility clauses are found in each 
provision of the convention establishing 
anti-BEPS measures. The compatibility 
clauses interact with the notification 
clauses.
Detailed compatibility clauses cannot 
be found in each provision of the 
convention. However, in cases of treaty 
conflicts the Mauritius Convention 
should prevail over existing treaties on 
the basis of the application of the lex 
posterior principle.
Possibility to modify 
future treaties through the 
convention
Yes
No. The convention applies only in 
connection with IIAs concluded before 
1 April 2014.
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6. Conclusions
This article has reviewed the techniques used in the Multilateral Tax Instrument and 
the Mauritius Convention. It has shown that despite the complexity of modifying, 
through a single instrument, treaty networks comprising more than 3,000 treaties 
with customized rules based on the investment flows and economic interests of 
the contracting States, treaty makers have multiple tools to effectively achieve such 
modifications. Thus, future modifications to numerous treaties can be done using 
tools similar to the ones implemented in the Multilateral Tax Instrument and the 
Mauritius Convention. 
An important lesson from the comparison of the two conventions is that to attract 
universal participation, treaty makers need to focus on narrow subjects on which 
consensus is easier to reach and to provide for a high level of flexibility. The flexibility 
may be implemented through opting-in mechanisms, alternative provisions, 
reservations or a combination of all of these, as in the Multilateral Tax Instrument. 
Although flexibility may jeopardize the implementation of harmonized rules, treaty 
makers can always adopt measures to attain a certain level of coordination or 
uniform implementation of the rules across the treaty network; for example, 
providing for an exhaustive list of the permitted reservations and allowing parties to 
withdraw the reservations at any time so that parties can more thoroughly conform 
to the object and purpose of the treaties. If the Multilateral Tax Instrument and the 
Mauritius Convention succeed, it can be expected that the practice of modifying 
an exhaustive number of treaties through a single instrument will continue to be 
used in the future. Moreover, if the Multilateral Tax Instrument and the Mauritius 
Convention succeed, policymakers engaged in the discussions of changes to IIAs 
and changes to tax treaties could join forces to coordinate the implementation of 
treaty changes to IIAs and tax treaties that may be required in order to promote 
investment through a single treaty. 
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